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Abstract 
Researchers within the field of political science have been analyzing the effects of legislative-
executive relations for several decades and both parliamentarism and presidentialism have 
their critics and proponents. However, this topic needs revisiting, especially after Sri Lanka 
and Turkey recently experienced a shift in legislative-executive relations. This thesis aims to 
examine the effect of presidentialism’s interaction with lack of judicial and legislative control 
on the executive on control of corruption in developing democracies. The hypothesis claims 
that the higher the degree of presidentialism in a developing democracy, the more likely is the 
state to exhibit higher levels of corruption, due to the lack of judicial and legislative 
constraints on the executive. 
The hypothesis and the theory it is based on is tested quantitatively by employing an OLS 
multivariate regression analysis. Presidentialism was measured by taking the mean value of 
several VDem indicators describing presidential prerogatives. An interaction variable was 
composed of the presidentialism variable and the mean value of legislative and judicial 
control on the executive. Furthermore, six control variables were introduced to the 
multivariate regression. According to the results, the hypothesis had to be rejected, as 
presidentialism interacting with lack of judicial and legislative control on the executive is not 
correlated with higher levels of corruption at a level of significance. This result is important, 
as it shows that when employing a different measurement of presidentialism, taking a smaller 
sample size and adding an interaction effect can show a completely different result than that 
discussed in the literature review.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” 
-- Lord  John Dalberg-Acton  
In 1870, Lord Acton wrote a letter to a scholar Mandell Creighton in which he wrote the very 
same quote, pronouncing his opposition to the move to promulgate the catholic doctrine of 
papal infallibility (Acton-Dalberg and Edward 1907). This powerful quote by the famous 18th 
century British historian still resonates strongly even today, especially after Turkey’s 
transition from a parliamentary republic to a presidential democracy, giving more powers to 
the Turkish president Tayyip Erdoğan (Seyrek 2017).  
Conversely, in 2015, Sri Lanka’s president Sirisena voluntarily diminished his presidential 
prerogatives in favor of the legislature by passing the 19th Amendment to the Constitution, 
being one of the few heads of state that would ever do so. The legislature (including the 
opposition) and the populace have responded highly positive to this development. However, it 
is yet to be seen if Sri Lanka will complete its transition to a parliamentary republic. This 
move surprised almost everyone and it was the first time in recent years a democratic country 
started to peacefully transform its core institutional arrangements (Dibbert 2017). Sri Lanka 
seems to be phasing out presidentialism in favor of parliamentarism, while the opposite is 
happening in Turkey. But, does the type of democratic government matter? 
The importance of good institutions for development is a vastly discussed topic in the realm 
of political science. What are good institutions? How do we get them? Why do they matter? 
These are just a few questions that political scientists are still attempting to answer today. 
Even when these questions are answered, causal pathways that connects institutions with 
quality of government (QoG) are seldom explored.  
Since the dawn of comparative politics, there have been many published papers and books 
discussing different types of regimes, democracies, leaderships etc. Yet, it was not until later 
that researchers started to pay attention to the practical, real-life effects of different systems. 
The type of government is broadly discussed in the political science literature, with research 
varying from qualitative to quantitative in nature analysis. However, many of them do not 
provide a solid causal pathway that connects the effects with the type of institution. This is 
evident from the thesis’ literature review in which various articles and books are critically 
discussed. Several notable works were examined and a common thread was revealed. The 
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data used was in most cases outdated and in need of refreshing, statistical analyses opted for 
dichotomous measurement of presidentialism, the number of cases was either too small or too 
large, and most notably, the authors did not examine the causal pathway of how the type of 
government affects the state’s quality of government.  
The thesis aims to discuss and resolve a significant gap concerning the lack of thorough 
empirical analysis of the effects of the type of government. Furthermore, it argues that there 
should be more focus on this sort of research, as we are discussing basic institutions, which 
have the potential to pave any future development of a state. Deciding between a 
parliamentary and presidential system is something every democratic state faces at its birth 
and can have a significant impact on how a state functions. One of the possible outcomes that 
have been associated with government type is corruption. Analyzing the correlation between 
types of government and corruption is also important for perhaps determining that one system 
might not fit a particular state, because the leaders in such states are prone to kleptocratic 
behavior. 
There is without a doubt, more than several researches conducted in this specific field of 
political science. However, I would argue that there is still much to be explained. The thesis’ 
biggest contribution to the field is the explanation of the causal pathway. This thesis aims to 
give a more detailed insight on how a state’s institutional arrangement affects QoG or in this 
case, corruption. Moreover, the thesis also features some other novelties such as focusing 
solely on developing democracies, developing a revised scale for measuring presidential 
powers and using almost up to date statistical data from several reputable sources. It should be 
noted that most of the quantitative literature analyzed in the thesis found a significant 
correlation between presidentialism and QoG. However, most of them had at least one, if not 
several, of the gaps my thesis seeks to address.   
In this thesis, the measure of presidentialism is analyzed and its consequences. This subject 
needs revisiting, especially after 2015 when the Sri Lankan government announced that they 
would limit the power of the executive, and restore constitutional democracy and good 
governance. The thesis also coincides with Turkey’s shift to a presidential system on April 
2017. If both states fully complete this transition and it simultaneously shows progress or 
digression respectively in terms of GDP and control of corruption, it might indicate that 
presidentialism is not the best fit for developing states.  
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The thesis consists of six chapters and it is a quantitative study. In the literature review, 
previous scholarship is examined and the gaps are identified, justifying the need for further 
exploration of the phenomenon. Following the literature review, the theoretical approach 
argues how presidentialism can through a lack of developed democratic institutions affect 
QoG, while also describing the aim, research question and hypothesis of the thesis. The 
methodology chapter discusses the methods used for analyzing the data, sources of data and 
the operationalization of relevant variables. Furthermore, limitations of the data and method 
are also pointed out in this chapter. The analysis chapter empirically examines the hypothesis 
and discusses the results. The final chapter, the conclusion, revisits the discussion of the 
results and the implications it might have on the scholarship discussed in the literature review 
and to the study of political science.   
In the following chapter I will be conducting four separate literature reviews covering the 
effects of institutions on QoG, presidentialism and its characteristics, type of executive and 
QoG, and the measurement of presidentialism. Before concluding, I will combine the 
literature reviews and write my own research proposals, which could cover the gap/s I have 
spotted during my review of the literature.  
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, the thesis seeks to address and summarize what is missing in the scholarship 
concerning the type of government and corruption. Through the course of this literature 
review the thesis will attempt to demonstrate that the relationship between presidentialism and 
control of corruption has not been fully explained so far. Although there is no shortage of 
research on this phenomenon, several gaps still need to be addressed, chief among them being 
the lack of a causal pathway. Additionally, there are also gaps concerning the measurement of 
the type of executive (opting for dichotomous measurement instead of continuous), number of 
cases (either choosing too many or too little) and in some cases, disputable operationalization 
of variables. Last, but not least, the scholarship needs an update, as most of the scholarship 
dates to the early 90s and early 2000s. Since then, several countries have developed in terms 
of economic capabilities and level of democracy.  
My thesis seeks to address all the aforementioned gaps by employing a continuous 
measurement of presidential powers, using up to date statistical data for 83 developing 
democratic states from various reputable statistical sources (VDem, QoG, World Bank) and 
providing a causal pathway to explain how the level of presidentialism affects the levels of 
corruption. The literature review will be divided into four subchapters: political institutions 
and QoG, presidentialism vs parliamentarism, type of executive and QoG and measuring 
presidentialism.   
2.1 Political institutions and QoG 
There is an overarching consensus that performance of democracies is based on their age and 
therefore, newer democracies tend to perform worse in terms of economic performance and 
perceiving corruption. In terms of QoG, older and established democracies seem to perform 
better because leaders there have incentives to improve QoG, because a certain degree of 
wealth has already been reached, while in new democracies, there is little incentive for long-
term bureaucratic investments (Charron and Lapuente 2009). This was also previously 
researched by Keefer (2007), who argues that because younger democracies lack credible 
politicians, this in turn leads to high transfers, high rent seeking and low-levels of non-
targeted good provisions.  
One of the reasons (if not the most important one) for why young democracies suffer with 
their new found political regime is due to lacking properly developed institutions. Djankov et 
al. (2003) argue that before a state can successfully transition from an autocracy to a 
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democracy, a state must have developed institutions prior to the transition, otherwise it will 
suffer low economic development. Acemoglu et al. (2005) also pointed out main that every 
social change in each country should be considered in the light of its own institutional 
possibilities. There has been a significant focus on researching the role which institutions play 
in providing public goods and fostering economic growth (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).  
2.2 Presidentialism vs parliamentarism 
Types of government are also defined as executive-legislative relations and they are very 
broadly divided into three categories: parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential 
systems. In a parliamentary system of government, the head of government (usually called 
prime-minister) and his/her cabinet, whom are not directly elected, are responsible to the 
legislative branch by being dependent on its confidence and they may be dismissed from 
office with a vote of no confidence. In a presidential system, however, the head of 
government (the president) is popularly elected for a constitutionally prescribed period and 
cannot be removed from office by the legislature. The other and possibly more important 
difference is that in a presidential system, the ministers serve merely as advisers and 
subordinates to the president, while in a parliamentary system, the prime minister cannot 
make executive decision without the rest of the cabinets’ consent (Lijphart 1999, 116-117). 
Presidential systems have thus several features that are highlighted by its proponents 
(Mainwaring 1990). These include:  
1. Stability: government stability due to the executive being independently elected from 
the legislature. 
2. Legitimacy: the president is directly elected in general election, granting legitimate 
powers to the leader.  
3. Effectiveness: a president with strong presidential powers can enact changes more 
quickly than in a parliamentary system 
4. Checks and balances: the executive headed by the president is removed from the 
legislature. This makes two completely independent entities that monitor and check 
each other, thus preventing potential abuses of power.  
Many of the advantages the presidential system entails have been heavily criticized by 
scholars. Government stability by itself does not necessarily imply democratic stability, 
legitimacy can be questioned in states where elections have a history of “unfairness” etc.  
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However, checks and balances is something that needs to be considered further. Ackerman et 
al. (2011) argue that politicians have an incentive to enhance their power via creating 
institutions that provide them greater freedom to act and by undermining institutions that were 
designed to check their influence. Furthermore, they argue that presidents are more likely to 
test the limits of their power and an independently elected president can act without seeking 
legislative approval or being worried of judicial constraints. Ackerman et al. describe these 
presidential states as hyper-presidential systems, where the electorate conducts the bare 
minimum oversight on the president and its office. They find that in Argentina and the 
Philippines presidents have repeatedly undermined institutional efforts to limit their power by 
pushing the boundaries of the law or simply by finding legal loopholes.  
The system of checks and balances appears to be flawed in states where the democratic 
institutions are not as powerful as the president’s office. In such states the scales of power are 
in favor of the president. Checks and balances being a positive feature of presidential systems 
can be considered as a gap.  
2.3 Type of executive-legislative relations and QoG 
Forming the type of government is an important factor when forming a democratic state. 
There is an abundance of articles and books written about the difference between the 
presidential and parliamentary system and how each affects QoG. While some scholars 
advocate the advantages of presidentialism, most are in an agreement that presidential systems 
are a poor choice overall (Linz 1990, Ljiphart 1999). While the president is elected in general 
elections and is supposed to speak on behalf of the entire country, the president in most cases 
clearly stands for a partisan political option.  
Linz (1990) in The Perils of Presidentialism, through a qualitative study compares 
parliamentary and presidential democracies. Linz describes the paradoxes of presidential 
regimes in great detail, citing that such systems are set out to be strong and stable executive 
regimes with a strong public legitimation to counter particular interests. However, presidents 
hold a great deal of power while not necessarily needing consent for each action, essentially 
making them elected kings. Linz sheds some light on the often-cited statement, that 
presidential systems are more stable due the executive being more independent from the 
legislature, thus enjoying greater flexibility. Stability is thus ensured via continuity. However, 
stability is ensured only when the president is benevolent. In the opposite case, a president 
that who has lost the confidence of his party or the people is a detriment to democratic 
[9] 
 
stability and is very difficult to replace. Impeachment is possible; however, it is a very 
uncertain and time-consuming process.  
Linz (1994) continues his research on executive with an empirical work in which he argues 
that presidentialism leads to political instability that threatens democracy. According to Linz, 
in presidential states, due to the separation of powers between the executive and the 
legislature, incentives for cooperation in governing are reduced which leads to an increase of 
opportunities for conflict that result in democratic deadlock and breakdown. This work is 
considered one of the milestones in analyzing political systems and as a basis for further 
research. His work, however, did not to provide much needed greater empirical evidence, as 
he considered only Latin -American states and relied solely on democratic breakdowns, not so 
much on governance. Linz’s work was later heavily criticized by Cheibub (2006).  
Moving forward from Linz’s work, Shugart (1999) researched on how presidentialism and 
parliamentarism were associated with the provision of collective goods in less-developed 
countries. In his work, Shugart goes against Linz’s assumptions about the type of executive 
and its effects on and quality of government, stating that presidentialism may be more suitable 
for most developing countries for sustaining democracy. His work is mostly theoretical in 
nature, as he gives good explanations and definitions of presidential and parliamentary 
systems, going into detail about their respective power structures and cabinet formations. 
However, he does not provide detailed empirical evidence for presidentialism being a better 
option for providing collective goods. His empirical analysis relies on putting lower and 
middle-income democracies/semi-democracies in presidential and parliamentary columns and 
assigning the GINI index value from 1998 to the respective country. The analysis is thus 
conducted by simply looking at the table and counting the number of democracies in each 
column of regime type that are below and above the 40.0 threshold. By doing so, the author 
concluded that parliamentary states are more likely to be able to address inequality, without 
going into a much more detailed statistical analysis, which has been done previously by the 
peers he referred to. Despite his analysis, he still argues that these presidential democracies 
would be worse off in a parliamentary form due to multiple parties representing different 
occupational groups or regions and could potentially shut out important societal interests, due 
to the apparent manufacturing of majorities for one party.  
Lane and Ersson (2000, 134-138) went deeper into researching the differences by providing a 
more thorough analysis of the correlations between the form of government and political and 
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socioeconomic outcomes. The authors found that the correlation between presidentialism and 
democracy (using variables:  democracy scores, violence scores, protest scores, executive 
change, party system disproportionality, effective number of parties, party system 
fractionalization and number of years of present constitution) is both negative and strong. The 
negative correlation is even stronger when examining state performance based on social and 
economic criteria (using variables: economic growth, real GDP per capita, human 
development index, GINI index, female parliamentary representation). They conclude that 
one cannot draw conclusions that the type of government is decisive in this analysis, as there 
might be other factors in play and the regression analysis only demonstrates correlation, not 
causality. Authors do not mention which might be the other explaining factors, however, they 
do touch upon a valid issue in researching the causal pathways. Furthermore, their analysis 
did not include any sort of control variables. The authors opted for testing 
independent/separate relationship between presidentialism and political/economic outcomes 
instead of employing a multivariate analysis with multiple models. Moreover, the set of 
analyzed cases is too heterogenous, taking into consideration several non-democratic 
countries such as China and Saudi Arabia. Lane (2008) in a different study, analyzed effects 
of the type of government. In his book, he concluded, that parliamentarism performs better in 
terms of rule of law. 
Krouwel (2003) is an often-cited political scientist for moving away from using nominal 
variables for describing types of executive-legislative relations by using his own measurement 
for presidentialism as an independent variable. In his work, he analysed the relationship 
between presidnetialism, parliamentarism and government stability. The correlation between 
presidentialism and cabinet duration was negative and weak (Pearson’s r=–0.34). However, 
his empirical research was limited only to 12 cases from post-socialist European state. Despite 
this empirical limitation, his scale for measuring the level of presidentialism proved to be an 
intuitive tool for measuring and defining political regimes, which the thesis will discuss in the 
following sub-section. 
Yet, even in doing regressions, finding causal pathways seems to be a difficult feat when 
determining if presidentialism or parliamentarism has any effect on the performance of 
democratic states. Gerring and Thacker (2004) have focused their research on determining 
whether political institution or rather more specifically, how the role of unitarism and 
parliamentarism affect the levels of perceived political corruption. By employing a weighted-
least-squares regression (WLS) on the Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton corruption index 
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(KKZ) and an ordinary-least-squares regression (OLS) on the Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index, the authors find that parliamentary forms of government help 
reduce the levels of corruption. Where their research differs from others, is that they 
attempted to identify the causal pathway from the type of government to corruption. The 
authors draw on seven disparate causal mechanisms:  
1. Openness, transparency and information costs 
2. Intergovernmental competition 
3. Localism 
4. Party competition 
5. Decision rules 
6. Collective action problems  
7. Public administration 
With these seven causal mechanisms, the authors explain how the type of executive-
legislative relations can have an impact on perceived levels of corruption and they conclude 
that parliamentarism/federalism work through multiple channels to influence corruption 
outcomes. While they do provide some novelty in a sense that previous research focused only 
on one single causal factors instead of several, they conclude their final thoughts by stating 
that they could not test these causal mechanisms empirically. 
Kunicova’s and Rose-Ackerman’s research (2005) analyzes the electoral rules and 
constitutional structures as possible constraints on corruption. The authors argue that elections 
provide incentives for politicians to pursue certain kind of policies and at the same time 
elections constrain politician from exhibiting corrupt behavior. Their main hypothesis is that 
proportional representation systems are more susceptible to corrupt behavior while at the 
same time examining the effect of electoral rules with presidentialism. This cross-sectional 
empirical analysis was done on 94 democracies that scored at least 5.5 on the Freedom House 
score. According to the authors, presidents in a presidential type of government control the 
executive branch that has rent-creating possibilities that can be used for personal gain. 
Because, the legislative parties are less powerful in a presidential system, they must 
constantly negotiate with the president, while the president him/herself has undivided power 
over many sources of rents, which are diverted for personal gain easier than in a collegial 
system of cabinet government. Using federalism, GDP per capita and Freedom House Index, 
the authors through an OLS regression find that PR systems in conjunction with 
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presidentialism, are associated with higher levels of corruption. However, the authors have an 
operationalization of presidentialism does not match their theoretical descpription of that 
system. A presidential dummy variable was derived from World Bank’s Database on Political 
Institutions and coded a presidential state as 1, if the system had a directly elected president, 
independent of the legislature. That by itself does not make a system presidential, as for 
example, Macedonia is a parliamentary democracy, with the president holding a more or less 
symbolic role as head of state, but is still elected independently from the legislature. Thus, 
some states such as Macedonia and Bulgaria, were coded as presidential states, even though 
they are examples of parliamentary democracies with the prime minister being the head of 
government, not the president. This coding no doubt affected the OLS regression results, as 
these states are proportional democracies with relatively high levels of corruption in Europe.  
Another important piece of scholarship was done by Cheibub (2006) with his book 
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and Democracy. One of the main points of Cheibub’s book 
is that the generally subscribed view that there is something inherently problematic about 
presidential institutions, something that needs to be eliminated in order for the state to operate 
properly, should be discussed further. The author argues that there is nothing wrong with 
presidential institutions per se (Cheibub 2006:6). Cheibub argues that presidential 
democracies are more fragile than parliamentary democracies due to historical coincidence, 
meaning that states where militarism remained strong after the transition to democracy were 
also states that adopted presidential institutions. Democratic breakdown of presidential 
systems is thus due to those states previously having military dictatorship. This analysis was 
conducted by employing a logistic regression covering all democracies from 1946 to 2002. 
Cheibub’s analysis (and the entire book) is incredibly detailed and exposes some flaws of 
previous scholarships’ views on the effects of presidentialism. However, Cheibub accepts 
Linz’s overarching empirical conclusion about presidential state that on average they do not 
last as long as parliamentary states before they transition/collapse into authoritarianism. It is 
the causal pathway that Cheibub disputes in Linz’s article (Cheibub 2006:136-147). The 
thesis does not argue against Cheibub’s work, as it does not analyze democratic breakdown 
per se. The thesis focuses entirely on presidentialism as is and how it affects corruption levels. 
The thesis acknowledges that there are underlying reasons why presidentialism comes to be in 
new democracies (militarism) and how it affects democratic breakdown, but It focus solely on 
governance. 
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The research by Gerring and Thacker (2009) entails an analysis about the practical effects of 
presidentialism/parliamentarism. They test the relationship between a historical measure of 
parliamentary rule and fourteen different indicators which range across three key policy areas: 
economic development, human development and political development. By employing a 
cross-country regression, they find that there is a strong relationship between parliamentarism 
and good governance (using indicators for human and economic development). Yet, even 
though the authors come to the same conclusion regarding parliamentarism and good 
governance, they still end their research by stating that further exploration of specific causal 
mechanisms is needed. In their research, they only gave suggestions to some possible causal 
mechanism  without going into further detail in describing them.  
With all that said, the main problem in analyzing the effects of type of government on 
perceived levels of corruption is the lack of a fully formed causal pathway. Furthermore, 
works such as those of Linz (1994) and Krouwel (2003) employed a very low number of 
cases, which only gives a small picture on presidentialism’s true effects.  
2.4 Measurement of presidentialism 
Creating a scale for measuring presidentialism is not particularly new. Several political 
scientists have been trying to devise an effective scale for measuring presidentialism with 
mixed results. Shugart and Carey (1992:148-166) assessed presidential powers by dividing all 
powers into legislative and non-legislative powers. Presidential powers were assessed on a 0-4 
scale and then summed up. A higher value meant more presidential powers. However, the 
authors’ sole focus was on powers mentioned in the constitution, not taking into consideration 
political practice and informal use of power. 
Frye (1997) developed a method involving dividing the president’s formal powers into two 
distinct groups: the powers owned solely by the president and those that are performed 
together with the parliament or the government. This power index is a combination of 27 
different presidential powers, merged into a single index. All powers are equally weighted 
equally, which does create some issues. For example, he regards addressing the parliament of 
equal importance as the ability to propose legislation or dissolving the parliament.  
A better measure was created by Siaroff (2003, pp. 303-305) in which he measured informal 
powers in addition to formal powers of the president. These powers include veto powers, 
appointment of some key individuals or cabinet members, ability to chair formal cabinet 
meetings, emergency decree powers for national disorder etc. Siaroff’s scale for measuring 
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presidential powers was a step in the thesis’ direction in addressing the measurement gap, yet, 
it takes issue with the dichotomous coding for presidential powers. A president has a central 
role in forming the government or he/she does not. This type of coding does not allow for 
subtle differences, when there are cases when both the prime-minister and the president are 
responsible in forming the government. Furthermore, by adding direct election of the 
president as a variable for measuring presidential powers can add unnecessary value towards 
presidential powers, which the thesis will elaborate on later. 
Krouwel’s (2003) measurement is the most interesting and well developed. Instead of trying 
to develop a measurement only for presidential powers, he tries to determine the level of 
presidentialism. His scale ranges from pure presidential score to pure parliamentary score by 
having coded seven constitutional elements: election of the head of state, dissolution of 
parliament, vote of investiture, vote of confidence, ministerial appointments, dissolution of 
parliament and executive powers. Each variable that is associated with presidentialism 
receives the score of 1, the score of 0 if it is not associated with presidentialism and a score of 
0.5 if the powers are shared or limited. Both presidential and parliamentary scores are 
summed up and the final measure of presidentialism is calculated by subtracting the 
parliamentary score, with a positive score indicating presidentialism and a negative indicating 
parliamentarism. Thus, the Czech Republic scored -4.5 and Russia scored a 4.5. Krouwel’s 
method works on many levels. The variables are equally weighted; it departs from 
dichotomous coding and the scale could be used for any form of government. However, as 
with Shugart’s and Carey’s measure, Krouwel also looks solely on the constitutional basis for 
the president’s power, not considering its use in practice and informal powers. He also makes 
a point, that having a variable that represents the direct election of the president is crucial in 
constructing a measure for presidential. The thesis argues against this last point. 
Both Siaroff and Krowel argue that the direct election of the president is central to his or her 
legitimacy and thus power. Hellwig and Samuels (2007: 70-72.  argue that presidents are held 
accountable by the electorate and they can be punished by it by not being voted for in the next 
election. This thesis argues against this point. While it is true that the president being directly 
elected by the people makes the president directly accountable to the people and not the 
legislature, that does not necessarily translate to actual power. A great deal of states that are 
classified as parliamentary republics have a directly elected president as a head of state. For 
example, Slovenia also has a directly elected president, but his role is largely ceremonial in 
practice, with very limited power entrusted into his position. However, if we take for example 
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a country like South Africa, where the president is elected by the legislature, the head of 
state’s powers resembles more that of the President of the United States than of a European 
parliamentary state. If we followed Krouwel’s coding scheme, South Africa would receive a 
score of 0 in this category, while Slovenia would receive a score of 1. While the final score 
would certainly give South Africa an edge when it comes to the level of presidentialism, it can 
make cross-sectional comparisons less valid. If we were to follow Krouwel’s coding scheme 
even more strictly, USA would also get a score of 0 in this category, as the president of the 
United States is voted through an indirect election via the Electoral College (latest election 
proves that the most popular votes do not necessarily guarantee a victory for the candidate). 
While this coding would not be a good fit for measuring presidential powers, the thesis also 
argues that it is also not an adequate variable for classifying political systems.  
Krouwel’s measurement provides an excellent basis for constructing a new variable for 
measuring presidentialism. The new scale developed in the thesis will build upon his by not 
taking into consideration whether the head of state was directly elected or not, vote of 
investiture and vote of no confidence. The first factor was not taken into consideration due to 
the misleading assumption it entails - that a directly elected head of state has potentially more 
power than an indirectly elected head of state. The last two factors were not included due to 
them being factors that are based on laws written in the constitution and do not necessarily 
take into consideration practice. The new proposed measurement adds several other factors 
(explained in detail in section 4.2.2.1), which are based on events that occur in practice. The 
new scale thus relies more on presidential prerogatives (or limitations) that are being used in 
practice rather than merely stated by law.  
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3 THEORETICAL APPROACH 
In this chapter I will expand upon the concepts described in the literature review to explain 
how presidentialism affects corruption in a developing democracy. My thesis will explore the 
relationship between institutional design of the executive and corruption in developing 
democratic states. Finally, this section will present the hypothesis of the thesis and its 
argumentation. 
3.1 Presidentialism and judicial/legislative oversight on the executive 
In the previous chapter the thesis reviewed the relevant literature concerning democratic 
institutions, the debate between presidentialism and parliamentarism, presidentialism’s effect 
on QoG and how it has been measured so far. In this sub-chapter, the gaps found in the 
literature and the theory about oversight on the executive and political will come together to 
explain how presidentialism causally affects the levels of corruption. 
Since checks and balances (or rather lack thereof) is representing my causal pathway, it is 
worth delving into this a bit more. Stapenhurst et al.  (2006: 101-105) argue that institutional 
restraints on power is an important mechanism in checking corruption. The checks and 
balances system is created by horizontal accountability between the executive, legislature and 
the judiciary. Both the judicial and legislative branches, given adequate independence, can 
effectively restrain abuses of power by the executive branch and even penalize such abuses. 
Many states have adequate laws on corruption and other abuses of power, but are not always 
effectively enforced. However, such laws are not properly enforced in developing states. 
Thus, due to powerful politicians, elite interests, or oligarchs’ interests, both the legislature 
and judiciary are not incapable of effectively curbing corruption. 
The argument of the thesis’ causal pathway is that developing democracies do not have 
developed institutions of checks and balances that would properly oversee the executive’s 
actions. But, what makes them undeveloped? Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2015: 50-54) raise an 
important argument in this regard. When it comes to legislative oversight on the executive, 
information is very important for them to properly function. The need for information is even 
greater in developing democracies, in which important policy-relevant information is most 
often exclusively in the hands of the executive branch. Because the legislative branch does not 
have access and is not completely free from the government’s influence, it cannot properly 
criticize the government’s choices or propose policy alternatives. Since, governments under 
presidential systems have exclusive domain of the executive and the parliaments have even 
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less say in matter of policies and information they receive, their inability to competently 
oversee the executive is diminished. Alt and Lassen (2008) found that divided governments 
(one major party in the executive and an opposite party having the majority of seats in the 
legislature) are associated with lower levels of corruption in US federal states. However, the 
US is a developed democracy with a long history of presidentialism. Moreover, the legislature 
has access to properly scrutinize the executive (whether it is on a regional or national level). 
They also emphasize that an independent judiciary also plays a key role in curbing corruption. 
La Porta et al. (2004) have investigated whether judicial checks on the executive act as a 
guarantee of freedom. By using data for 71 states around the world, they find that the 
independence of the judiciary and constitutional review are associated with greater political 
freedom (using various indices of democracy, political rights and human rights) and greater 
economic freedom (by measuring lightness of government regulation, infrequency of state 
ownership, and security of property rights).  
Bazuaye and Oriakhogba (2016) through a case study in Nigeria demonstrate how the 
judiciary plays a key role in preventing corruption. The judiciary is important in its work by 
complementing the efforts of other arms of the government in the fight against corruption and 
other abuses of power. However, this role is not fulfilled properly when political and 
constitutional factors hinder its operations. For example, Nigeria needs strong procedural and 
substantive laws to combat corruption and allow the judiciary more freedom. These problems 
are not only a part of Nigeria’s institutional design, but they are common for most developing 
democracies. 
However, some states analyzed in the thesis have been “stuck” in the unsuccessful process of 
democratization for quite some time. Is presidentialism itself the cause of it? No, not 
necessarily. Persson and Sjöstedt (2012: 620-625) talk about political will being an important 
causal factor in the development process. They rely on two theories to back up their claim: 
principal-agent theory and state theory. If we would view the electorate or the citizens as the 
principal (the authority that delegates tasks to the agent), and the president and its cabinet as 
the agent (the authority that is supposed to execute the will of the principal), a clear principal-
agent problem can be seen in developing democracies. The authors argue that the agent (in 
this case the president and its cabinet) will act in his or her own interests and betray the 
principal, because the state lacks formal monitoring and screening mechanisms such as, 
transparency, accountability mechanisms and an effective institutional framework. The 
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benefits of breaking the promises made to the electorate overweight the costs of keeping it. 
Furthermore, there is also the problem of moral hazard, which arises as a result of the agent 
having more information than the principal does. This fits with what has been said earlier 
about the executive having more information than the legislative branch does. The authors 
argue that when the actions of the agent are unobservable to the principal, which again falls in 
line with the legislature´s inability to oversee or control the executive’s actions in presidential 
states, the agent will continue this course of action as long as it benefits him/her. In a 
developed state, the agents have fewer possibilities to and incentives to act opportunistically 
because the principal (electorate/citizens in this case) is in fact a “principles principal”, 
meaning that it is willing and able to control the agent. In developing states, the principal 
lacks either the will or the ability to effectively control the agent.   
State theory involves the social contracts that is created between the citizens and the political 
leaders (ibid: 624-625). Leaders of states lacking a social contract are more likely to resort to 
corruption and other abuses of power due to the lack of coherent and well-defined public, and 
shorter time horizon of leaders. If a state lacks a defined social contract, leaders face multiple 
principals, which in turn might increase the chances of informational asymmetries and weaker 
monitoring capabilities. The authors argue that facing multiple principals, which are 
uncoordinated in their efforts to combine their different interests, the agent has more 
discretion and can get away with doing nothing to increase the development of the state or the 
well-being of its constituents. Short time horizon of leaders has a negative effect on political 
accountability, because leaders possess powers that have an expiration. Thus, they tend to 
focus on short-term enrichment instead of channeling his/her efforts on providing collective 
goods.  
To sum up, legislatures and judiciaries are limited with regards to their capabilities to 
effectively oversee, scrutinize and penalize the executive in developing democracies. The 
problem becomes even worse in presidential systems where the government has the exclusive 
rights on how policy information is distributed to other branches. This makes it harder for the 
legislature to properly evaluate and scrutinize the executive, even when the members of the 
parliament are not under the influence of corrupt behavior to begin with.   
In this sub-section of the thesis, a possible causal pathway was introduced. In developing 
democracies, due to the lack of proper and transparent channels of information, and lack of 
strong procedural and substantive laws to combat corruption, both the legislature and the 
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judiciary are ineffective in overseeing the executive branch of the government. The systems 
of checks and balances are thus compromised and in presidential systems, where the 
executive branch is under the president’s leadership and is completely removed from the 
legislature, is able to practice any sort of corruptive behavior, without the fear of any sort of 
retaliation.  
3.2 Research question and hypothesis 
The thesis focuses on how presidentialism affects corruption levels in developing 
democracies. To explore this relationship, a research question is needed to guide the thesis. 
Based on the theoretical approach, prior scholarship and its gaps that have been identified in 
the literature review, the following research question emerges: 
Are developing democracies with a higher degree of presidentialism associated with higher 
levels of corruption? 
The aim of the thesis is not only to examine the relationship between presidentialism and 
corruption, but also to explain it. Thus, if presidentialism does have an effect on the levels of 
corruption in developing democracies, how can this effect be explained? The lack of causal 
mechanisms is one of the gaps that was identified in the literature review. The thesis aims to 
shed light on the matter by adapting previous frameworks for measuring presidentialism and 
its effects on QoG into a new conceptualization of presidentialism. Moreover, the thesis will 
be using new data, different set of analyzed cases and an interaction variable which acts as the 
causal pathway. To achieve the aim of the thesis and to answer the research question, the 
following hypothesis was generated:  
H1: The higher the degree of presidentialism in a developing democracy, the more likely is 
the state to exhibit higher levels of corruption, due to the lack of judicial and legislative 
constraints on the executive.  
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4 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
This thesis aims to increase our understanding of how presidentialism affects the levels of 
corruption in developing states. As mentioned previously, research in the field on 
presidentialism is a very established field, yet this thesis argues that new knowledge can be 
added to the current scholarship. My hypothesis, which is in line with the theory, is that the 
more presidential powers a head of state has in his possession the higher the association is 
with control of corruption in a developing state, due to lack of judicial and legislative 
constraints on the head of state. This means that there is a negative correlation between the 
measure of presidential powers interacting with lack of judicial and legislative constraints on 
the executive with control of corruption.  
This thesis opted for an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multivariate regression in order to find 
out whether there is a correlation between the measure of presidential powers interacting with 
a measure on the extent of judicial/legislative constraints and control of corruption. Six 
control variables will be introduced in the regression which will result in a total of nine 
regression models. The thesis employs cross-sectional data for the OLS multivariate 
regression analysis, which means that the population consists of states in one point of time. 
The thesis opted for the year 2012, due to the availability of data. 
4.1 Case selection 
A large-N study should reach at least 30 number of cases for the purpose of ensuring 
statistical relevance. The cases have been selected based on two criteria - democracy and 
economic development. For a case to have been included in the analysis, it had to be a 
developing democracy. One of the goals of this thesis is to compare which democratic 
arrangements are associated with lower levels of corruption, which in turn requires a 
comparison between democratic states. The thesis focuses on developing democracies, 
because of the states’ relative democratic youth. Developed states such as the US and most of 
the EU democracies have a long tradition of democracy. Therefore, developed democracies 
were excluded from the analysis to allow the thesis to make comparison between relatively 
similar cases.  
There are several indicators that show whether a state is democratic or not. However, this 
paper opted for the Freedom House indicator found in the Vdem dataset (Coopedge et al. 
2017), which denotes a state’s status of freedom. The variable e_fh_status is a categorical 
variable with values 1- free, 2- partly free and 3- not free. These are values recoded from 
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Freedom House’s original coding which had values from 1 through 7, with 1 representing the 
highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom. A state is considered “free” if it scored an average 
rating of 1.0 to 2.5, “partly free” if it scored a rating 3.0 to 5.0 and “not free” if it scored a 
rating above 5.5. Since, I decided to analyze democratic states, I excluded every case that 
scored a rating higher than 5.5, hence removing cases with the value of 3 in the VDem 
dataset. The included cases are thus considered either “free” or “partly free”. I chose to 
include “partly free” states in my analysis as well, because while they might not share a 
substantial array of civil liberties as “free states” do, “partly free” states still qualify as 
electoral democracies by Freedom House, which is pertinent to my analysis of 
presidentialism. 
The next criteria, development, has been a source of controversy for some time now, because 
technically, there is no universally accepted criteria for what makes a state developing or 
developed. Then there is the issue of labelling a state as a developing one, indicating some 
sort of inferiority when comparing to a developed state. The World Bank has of 2016 ceased 
to divide state into two groups according to the concept of developed and developing. 
Nonetheless, a line in the sand had to be drawn and the thesis includes states based on their 
income. The World Bank (2017) classifies states into four income groups based on their gross 
national income (GNI) per capita: low income, lower middle income, upper middle income 
and high income countries. States that fell below the high income ($12,475) have been 
included in the analysis, while the rest have been excluded. All the cases that have been 
included in the analysis can be considered as developing states, which also matches the states 
designated as developing economies by the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic 
Outlook Report of 2015. The GNI data for the analyzed states was taken from the QoG 
Standard Dataset (Teorell et al. 2017).  
Based on the two criteria, 83 cases/states were included in the analysis spanning multiple 
continents and regions. 83 developing democracies is more than enough to provide sufficient 
statistical relevance.  
4.2 Variables 
4.2.1 Dependent variable: Control of Corruption 
The dependent variable should capture the level of corruption in an individual state. 
Corruption is generally defined as an action of abusing entrusted power for private gain and it 
includes both grand and petty corruption (Transparency International 2017). 
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The paper’s initial option was to use one of the corruption indicators from the VDem Dataset 
such as the Executive corruption index or the Political corruption index (Coopedge et al. 
2017). However, the thesis decided against it because it already uses independent variables 
constructed from VDem indicators. 
Therefore, the thesis opted for the Control of Corruption index compiled by the World Bank 
(CORRWB) from 2012 which can be found in the QoG Standard Dataset (Teorell et al. 2017). 
Similarly, to the Transparency International “perception of corruption”, it includes both petty 
and grand forms of corruption and the “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.  
However, unlike the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), it measures corruption in the public 
and private sector and relies not only on expert polls, but also on public opinion polls. The 
values range from -2.5 (most corrupt) to 2.5 (least corrupt). In the thesis’ sample, the most 
corrupt state Burundi has a Control of Corruption value of -1.44, while the least corrupt state, 
Botswana, holds a Control of Corruption value of 0.92.  
A caveat when using the CORRWB index is the same as with CPI. It is based on perceptions 
and it is highly discussed whether perceptions of corruption judged by survey responses 
accurately represent an empirical reality (real corruption). However, this paper would argue, 
as most other scholars have before, that it is highly unlikely that there would be low 
correlation between perceptions of corruption and actual corruption. To examine this, a 
bivariate analysis between the VDem v2exbribe, which measures how routinely do members 
of the executive grant favors in exchange for bribes (coded by country experts, usually 5 or 
more), and the CORRWB index. The value of Pearson's r was 0,705, indicating a high 
association between the two variables.  
4.2.2 Independent variables 
4.2.2.1 Measuring powers of the head of state with VDem variables 
VDem has created several variables that describe the powers of both the head of state and 
head of government for each respective state. While the information for head of government 
is somewhat lacking in recent data, head of state data is up to date. The most significant 
advantage over using these variables instead of those employed by previous researchers, is 
that they measure use of said powers in practice, giving a more “real” picture of the powers a 
head of state has in each state.  
The independent variable is a composite interval variable that was named parpres, which is a 
measure of the degree of power the head of state holds in each state. The higher the score, the 
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more power the head of state has in his or her possession and the higher the level of 
presidentialism. This variable was created by recoding and averaging eight of VDem’s 
variables on head of state and head of government characteristics (Coopedge et al. 2017). The 
variables included are: 
1. HOS removal by legislature in practice (e_v2x_corrv2exremhos_osp recoded into 
HOSremove) 
2. HOS dissolution of legislature in practice (v2exdfdshs_osp recoded into HOSdissolve) 
3. HOS appoints cabinet in practice (v2exdfcbhs_osp recoded into HOSappoints) 
4. HOS veto power in practice (v2exdfvths_osp recoded into HOSveto) 
5. HOS dismisses ministers in practice (v2exdfdmhs_osp recoded into HOSveto) 
6. HOS proposes legislation in practice (v2exdfpphsosp recoded into HOSpropose) 
7. HOS is also HOG (v2exhoshog recoded into HOSHOG) 
8. HOS power relation with HOG (v2ex_hogw recoded into HOSHOGpower) 
Recoding was done so that the values were increasing according to the power each head of 
state had (eg. higher value if it was less likely for the legislature to remove the head of state 
instead of originally a lower value). The coding can be observed in Appendix D. 
In the following section the thesis argues examines the new measure. HOSremove might not 
be considered as an actual power at first glance, but it can be defined as a passive power. The 
harder it is for the legislature to remove the head of state from office, the easier it is for the 
head of state to engage in corrupt behavior.  
HOSdissolve can be considered a very important power for the head of state. The easier it is 
for him/her to dissolve the parliament the easier it is for him/her to have a legislature ruled by 
the party the head of state is a part of. The theoretical advantage presidential systems have 
over parliamentary ones is the systems of checks and balances. That advantage dissolves 
when the head of state is part of the majoritarian political party in the legislature.  
HOSappoints is an important presidential power. The easier it is for the head of state to 
appoint the cabinet without an approval of the legislature or other entity, the easier it is for the 
head of state to do as he wishes. 
HOSveto is one of the most important powers a head of state has in its disposal and has been 
used as a measure for power by other researchers. The easier it is for the president to veto a 
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legislative proposal, the easier he or she can pursue or rather “override” policies that do not 
suit his or her particularistic or group interests. 
HOSdismisses has also been employed by other researchers mentioned previously. The ability 
to dismiss ministers that do not fit the president’s interests any longer can give the head of 
state more power to pursue his individual interests, by employing a more sympathetic 
minister. 
HOSpropose is a measure of the president’s ability to propose legislation and it is a power 
associated with presidential systems. Presidents in such political systems can potentially 
propose legislation that would benefit their individual or group interests.  
The final two variables describe the head of state’s relationship with the head of government. 
These variables are important for this measurement, as they capture the complexities of semi-
presidential political systems. The first one, HOSHOG, is important when defining the 
political system and the powers of the head of state. When the head of state is also the head of 
government, the power level is of course increased when comparing with the opposite 
scenario.  
Lastly, we have the variable HOSHOGpower, which measures the relative power the head of 
state has over the head of government when appointing and dismissing cabinet ministers. This 
is an important measurement that needs to be included to capture the complexities of political 
systems where the office of head of state and head of government are not held by the same 
person.  
4.2.2.2 Interaction with judicial and legislative constraints 
This is where the thesis truly diverges from the rest of the scholarship. The single most 
important argument for the advantage of presidential systems is the effective system of checks 
and balances in place between the executive, legislature and judiciary. However, the thesis 
(and some scholars) believe that this is not the case when it comes to developing democracies. 
Here, the paper referers once more to Djankov (2003) who argues that for a democratic 
country to successfully transition to a democracy, it must have developed institutions before-
hand. An effective legislature and judiciary in presidential systems, such as the US, can very 
often impede the president’s action, resulting even in impeachments.  
To analyse the inefficiency of this checks and balances system, this paper needed variables 
that would capture judicial and legislative constraints on the executive. Fortunately, the 
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VDem dataset captures this phenomenon with two variables: Judicial constraints on the 
executive index (v2x_jucon) and legislative constraints on the executive index (v2xlg_legcon) 
(Coopedge et al. 2017). The former is an index composed of indicators for how much does the 
executive respect the constitution, its compliance with the judiciary, compliance with the high 
court, high court independence and lower court independence. The latter, on the other hand, is 
an index that consists of indicators for how much the legislature question officials in practice, 
executive oversight, how much the legislature investigate the executive in practice and the 
strength of legislature’s opposition parties. As was the case with the main independent 
variable, both measurements are based on actions in practice which contributes to a more 
realistic picture of the situation. A higher value in each variable signifies a higher level of 
constraint on the executive. Since, I needed the variables to correlate negatively with Control 
of Corruption, I transformed both variables via deducting their original values from 1. Thus, a 
higher value now signifies less constraints on the executive. The coding can be observed in 
Appendix E. Next, both variables were merged and their mean values were calculated. The 
mean value represents the average lack of constraint (legislative and judicial) on the 
executive.  
The last step was to merge the main independent variable with the measure of lack of 
constraints on the executive. This was done by multiplying the variable parpres with 
lackconsttraint. The new variables was named interaction. The variables lackconstraint and 
interaction represent the causal pathway for the relationship between degree of 
presidentialism and corruption, i.e. the lack of checks on those powers.  
4.2.3 Control variables 
In my modeling choices, I looked for significant determinants of corruption that proved to be 
significant in the previous research to avoid omitted variable bias. The first control variable I 
decided to use is GDP per Capita measured by the World Bank. GDP per Capita is a 
commonly used control variable, as countries with more economic resources have a better 
chance in building state capacity and thus have the ability to tackle corruption (Mauro 1995). 
Wealthier countries have been found to exhibit less corruption on average, indicating that the 
level of economic development can be a strong determinant of corruption or QoG (Charron 
and Lapuente 2010). The GDP per capita variable was taken from the QoG Standard Dataset, 
where it can be found under the name wdi_gdppccur (Teorell et al. 2017). The paper used a 
natural logarithm of that variable, as it was not evenly distributed. The new variable was then 
named ln_GDP.  
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Since this cross-sectional analysis involves developing democratic states, a large number of 
them have economies that rely on the natural resources. By definition, natural resource rents 
(NRR) are different from other incomes, such as tax revenues or agricultural profits. 
Generating NRR involves the population to a minimal degree, as extraction is not particularly 
labor intensive. Another important aspect of NRR is that government profits can be enormous 
(Morrison 2009). However, Anthonsen et al. (2009) argue that greater fiscal dependency on 
external sources of government income the greater the likelihood is for low QoG due to lower 
vertical integration in society. Through a time-series cross-sectional OLS regression the found 
that NRR have negative effects on QoG, measured by indicators of bureaucratic quality, legal 
impartiality and levels of corruption. They argue their findings by saying that lack of 
development of a tax administration hampers bureaucratic professionalization and that NRR is 
profit with no political conditions attached. This in turn means that there are less incentives 
for elites to ensure accountability to the public. The variable wdi_natrr from the QoG 
Standard Dataset was used to control for natural resource rents. The variable measures the 
total natural resources rents as % of GDP and is the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal 
rents, mineral rents, and forest rents (Teorell et al. 2017). The variable was renamed to nrents, 
and later due to logging, ln_nrents  
Education and freedom of press have been used as an independent and control variable in 
several different researches. In a study by Lindstedt and Naurin (2005), the authors argued 
that transparency is an effective method of combating corruption under specific conditions. In 
their article education is used as an interaction and a control variable as they wanted to test if 
the correlation between freedom of the press and corruption could be accounted by the level 
of education and if higher levels of education increase the effect of the freedom of the press. 
The authors find that the interaction effect of freedom of the press with education and 
electoral democracy is associated with lower levels of corruption. The variable e_peaveduc 
(renamed to education), obtained from the VDem Dataset (Coopedge et al. 2017), measures 
the average years of education among citizens older than 15. Due to education being used 
prominently as a control variable in previous research, it should also serve as a suitable 
control variable for this thesis as well. The variable v2mecenefm_osp, also obtained from the 
VDem Dataset (Coopedge et al. 2017), measures the governments’ censorship effort on 
media. The variable was recoded and renamed to medcensor so that a higher value indicates 
more censorship instead of less (as was originally coded). Since I could none of the other 
[27] 
 
variables related to media freedom had enough cases, I chose this variable as a proxy for 
media freedom. 
Women’s political participation has also shown some correlation with levels of corruption. In 
the article Women’s Representation, Accountability, and Corruption in Democracies, Esarey 
and Schwindt-Bayer (2015) argue that higher women’s representation is linked to lower 
corruption due to electoral accountability, which they define as the ability of voters to identify 
corrupt politicians and punish them in the elections. Furthermore, they argue that the 
relationship between women’s representation and corruption is proportional to the risk of 
being held accountable for corruption. They performed a time-series OLS linear regression on 
78 democracies from the year 1990-2010. Through their findings they argue that greater 
levels of female representation is associated with lower levels of perceived corruption in 
countries where corruption is risky. Furthermore, more pertinent to the thesis, they find that 
women’s representation is negatively associated with perceived corruption in parliamentary 
systems. The VDem Dataset (Coopedge et al. 2017) contains the variable v2x_gender 
(renamed to fempolemp) which measures the political empowerment of women in a state. Due 
to the findings, the above study had, this variable would be ideal as a control variable for the 
analysis.  
For the last control variable, I opted for an indicator that represents the level of democracy of 
a state. There are several variables one can choose, from various datasets, yet, most are 
lacking up to date data. The only database that has up to data values is Freedom House. The 
variable e_fh_polity2, found in the VDem Dataset (Coopedge et al. 2017), measures the level 
of democracy of a state on a 0-10 scale. However, this variable also contains some missing 
cases, therefore, e_fh_ipolity2 (renamed into ipolity) is an imputed version of the same 
variable, meaning that it adds values to states where data on Polity is missing by regressing 
polity on the average Freedom House measure. According to Hadenius and Teorell (2005), 
this index performs better in regards to validity and reliability than its constituent parts. To 
show validity for the choice of this variable, the paper refers to Charron’s and Lapuente’s 
article (2009), where they argued that democracy can be a correlate of corruption. The authors 
also employed the Freedom House’s index of democracy and concluded that relationship 
between democracy and QoG is conditional, based on economic development.  
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4.3 Summary of collected data 
The modified dataset now includes 83 states that fall into the developing democracies 
category, based on the GNI and status of freedom respectively. For the dependent variable, 
the opted for the Control of Corruption variable which was designed by the World Bank and 
is based on perceptions. However, unlike the CPI, it measures both political and 
administrative corruption.  
The independent variable, parpres, measures how much power the head of state has in each 
state. A higher value signifies more power and prerogatives the individual possesses. The 
value represents the mean of eight original VDem variables that are equally weighted. To find 
the missing link between level of presidentialism and corruption, an interaction was 
established between the main independent variable and lackconstraint, which signifies to 
which degree does the judiciary and legislature lack in constraining the executive. The 
interaction effect was then named interaction.  
All control variables show association with levels of corruption in previous researches, thus 
making them suitable to pass for control variables in this thesis. Some control variables had to 
logged. The comparison between the original variables and their logged value can be found in 
Appendix C. The summary for all variables can be found in Appendix A.  
There are several limitations to the collected data, chief among them being the year the data 
was collected. While I would still argue that this data is more up-to date when comparing to 
previous researches, the data is still almost five years old and several states that might have 
been considered developing at the time might have passed that threshold in the following 
years. In another case, such as the case with Sri Lanka, the head of state has considerably less 
powers now than he did in 2012. Moreover, the data for some of the independent variables 
(that includes the variables parpres and lackconstraint, including their sub-variables) was 
collected by country experts. One should keep in mind that there is a possibility of biasness in 
the collected data. Furthermore, not all cases have the values of the control variables, that is 
why the regression analysis will be missing some cases in the final models. 
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5 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This section will present the analysis and the results of the OLS multivariate regression which 
will either support or reject the hypothesis that there is a negative linear relationship between 
degree of presidentialism (parpres) and control of corruption (concor). The relationship is 
expected to be negative due to the coding of both variables (a lower value of concor is equals 
less corruption in each state).  
First, the thesis conducts a bivariate analysis between the independent variable and dependent 
variable. Later, additional bivariate analyses between the dependent variable and each control 
variable. The latter test is designed to detect whether all of the explanatory variables show any 
correlation with the dependent variable. If they do, they can be kept in the analysis. A test for 
detecting outliers will also be used in the analysis. Bivariate analyses between the explanatory 
variables is also required in order to test for multicollinearity. Additionally, a Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) test will be conducted as an additional measure for detecting 
multicollinearity. The final preliminary test will be a test for heteroscedacity.  
5.1 Preliminary statistics 
The following table describes all the variables that will be used later in the multivariate 
regression models. All variables are continuous measurements. 
To show whether there is an association between the dependent and independent variable, and 
the control variables, we use the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (Pearson’s 
r). This measurement is used when exploring relationships between interval variables. It is a 
measure of both the direction and strength of association between variables with a value of -1 
indicating a perfect negative correlation and the value of +1 indicating a perfect positive 
correlation, however, neither of the extremes occur regularly. Figure 1 depicts an 
unconditional bivariate relationship between the dependent variable concor and the 
independent variable parpres. The linear regression line shows how a perfect correlation 
would look like.  
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Figure 1. Linear regression scatterplot.  
The downward line of the scatterplot suggests a negative relationship between the key 
explanatory variable and the outcome variable. It is hard to tell solely based on the graph 
which states can be considered outliers, therefore, further tests are required.  To find potential 
outliers a leverage versus squared residual plot was produced (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Leverage versus squared residual plot outlier test. 
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The plot was created after the final regression model was produced. In this plot, normally one 
would delete cases that are right from the vertical line and above the horizontal one. However, 
in this case, none of the cases are far from both lines simultaneously, thus I chose not to delete 
any cases prior to the OLS regression analysis.  
Table 1 shows the results of the bivariate analyses between the explanatory variables and the 
dependent variable. All variables are correlated with the dependent variable at a significant 
level. 
VARIABLE PEARSON’S R 
parpres -0.246* 
lackconstraint -1.458*** 
GDP 0.442** 
ln_nrent -0.320** 
ipolity 0.484** 
education 0.078** 
medcens -0.315** 
fempolemp 0.314** 
Table 1. Pairwise correlations between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable 
Table 2 reports pairwise correlation between the explanatory variables. Usually, whenever 
there are correlations between explanatory variables that exceed the Pearson´s r value of 0.8, 
multicollinearity occurs. However, none of the correlations exceed that value. 
 
Table 2. Pairwise correlations between explanatory variables. 
As an additional test for multicollinearity, VIF and tolerance values were taken into account. 
According to Field (2009, p. 325) a VIF value higher than 5 with a tolerance value of 0.2 
indicates signs of multicollinearity. As can be seen in Table 3, no values come close to that 
value, thus multicollinearity is not assumed.  
Variables parpres interaction ln_GDP ln_nrents ipolity education medcens fempolemp
parpres 1.00 0.576** -0.182 -0.291** -0.258* -0.258* 0.167 -0.050
ln_GDP -0.182 -0.326** 1.00 -0.418** 0.417** 0.768** -0.174 0.364**
ln_nrents -0.291** 0.176 -0.418** 1.00 -0.140 -0.355** 0.111 -0.009
ipolity -0.258* -0.545** 0.417** -0.140 1.00 0.386** -0.623** 0.518**
education -0.258* -0.337** 0.768** -0.355** 0.386** 1.00 -0.080 0.385**
medcens 0.167 0.530** -0.174 0.111 -0.623** -0.080 1.00 -0.268*
fempolem
p
-0.050 -0.233* 0.364** -0.009 0.518** 0.385** -0.268* 1.00
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 Tolerance VIF 
parpres ,592 1,690 
interaction ,422 2,370 
ln_GDP ,371 2,694 
ln_nrents ,741 1,349 
ipolity ,415 2,410 
education ,377 2,652 
medcens ,495 2,020 
fempolemp ,667 1,499 
Table 3. Tolerance and VIF values. 
When conducting an OLS regression, one has to make an assumption that the errors are 
constant (homoscedasticity). The test for heteroscedasticity involves charting a diagram 
between the regression’s standardized residuals and standardized predicted values. If a certain 
shape could be made out from the scatterplot (a megaphone or an hourglass) then 
homoscedasticity could not be assumed. However, as seen from the model in Figure 3, the 
cases are not spread out in any particular way, meaning that homoscedasticity can be 
assumed.  
 
Figure 3. Homoscedasticity test. 
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5.2 Multivariate OLS regression 
The multivariate regression tests the association between the dependent variable and 
explanatory variables (main independent, interaction and control variables) in 5 models. In 
each model an additional independent variable is added, starting with the main independent 
variable parpres. In the second model the interaction variable is added. In the last three 
models the control variables are added to see if the interaction remains significant. Table 3 
reports estimates from the multivariate regression analysis.  
 
Table 1. Multivariate regression model. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
The first model is a confirmation of the assumption that with more presidential powers there 
is lower control of corruption. As explained in the bivariate regression table, the relationship 
is negative and significant at a p<0.05 level. The value of -0.242 indicates that a one unit 
increase of the degree of presidential powers leads to a decrease in approximately 0.242 of 
control of corruption in average.  
However, adding the interaction term lackconstraint and the variable interaction (where 
parpres and lackconstraint are multiplied) results in all three variables losing significance. 
The relationship was tested further by adding control variables.  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
parpres -0.242* -0.078 0.035 0.062 0.071 0.095 0.084 0.066 -0.032
(0.11) (0.10) (0.21) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21)
lackconstraint -1.387*** -0.992 -0.675 -0.797 -0.510 -0.497 -0.956 -1.686
(0.27) (0.69) (0.65) (0.65) (0.70) (0.70) (0.77) (0.95)
interaction -0.322 -0.328 -0.257 -0.311 -0.309 -0.210 0.197
(0.52) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.59)
ln_GDP 0.162*** 0.136** 0.122* 0.150* 0.145* 0.135
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
ln_nrents -0.032 -0.033 -0.034 -0.039 -0.047
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ipolity 0.041 0.043 0.061 0.074
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
education -0.017 -0.026 -0.035
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
medcens 0.153 0.188
(0.11) (0.11)
fempolemp 0.080
(0.48)
_cons -0.190 0.141 0.010 -1.412** -1.160* -1.448** -1.565** -1.663** -1.524*
(0.13) (0.13) (0.25) (0.45) (0.49) (0.55) (0.58) (0.59) (0.65)
R-sqr 0.060 0.291 0.294 0.397 0.412 0.421 0.424 0.439 0.449
N 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 81
BIC 121.8 102.9 106.9 98.1 100.6 103.6 107.7 109.9 111.3
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The control variable ln_GDP with the coefficient value of 0.162 and being significant at 
p<0.001 was positively correlated with control of corruption. The coefficient value means that 
for each one unit increase in ln_GDP, control of corruption increases by 0.162.  
Adding the control variables ln_nrents, ipolity, education and medcens did not change the 
level of significance of any of the interaction variable. However, after adding ln_nrents and 
ipolity to the regression analysis, ln_GDP went from being significant at p<0.001 to p<0.01 
and p<0.05 respectively. The variable remained at that level of significance until the last 
control variable was introduced, fempolemp, after which ln_GDP became not significant.  
The final value of R2 is 0.449 which means the final regression model explains about 44% of 
the total variance for control of corruption. As corruption is difficult to fully predict, it is 
generally hard to get an R2 above 0.50, therefore, the value 0.449 seems acceptable.  
Moreover, to further test the relationship between the interaction variable and control of 
corruption, a robustness check was carried out. In appendix F3, two different OLS regression 
analysis results are shown. In the first robustness checks, same predictors were used as in the 
original OLS regression, but the dependent variable has been changed to measuring 
corruption using the Corruption Perceptions Index instead of Control of Corruption. The 
variable interaction was not significant in any of the models, but, lackconstraint was 
significant throughout the specifications. Ln_GDP was significant only until ln_nrents was 
introduced to the analysis, which was significant throughout the remaining models. In the 
second robustness check, the dependent variable from the original OLS regression remained 
the same, but most of the controls have been changed (see appendix A2 for list of variables). 
Interaction remained not significant throughout the specifications. Furthermore, 
lackconstraint was the only variable that was significant in the final model. In sum, the 
robustness checks provide further support to the initial results.  
There were several limitations when conducting the analysis that need to be taken into 
consideration. The first limitation was the lack of data for some states. This was particularly 
noticeable during the robustness checks were cases dropped significantly after adding more 
control variables. The most important factor that could have affected the results was the 
sample. First, the sample size was much smaller than most of the researches that were 
analyzed in the literature review. With fewer observations it is more difficult to find a 
significant correlation between the independent and dependent variables, especially when 
introducing the interaction and six control variables to the regression analysis. Second, the 
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composition of the sample – developing states only – could have also affected the results as, 
despite all states being classified as developing democracies (based on their GNI and Freedom 
House values), they still differ from each other in several notable ways. For example, the 
states covered in the thesis are from around the globe and some states have a colonial history, 
while other do not.  
Moreover, the thesis does not take into consideration the presidents themselves into much 
consideration. Even with severely underdeveloped judiciary and legislature, a head of state 
that will want to invest resources into fighting corruption and adopt regulations that promote 
better quality of governance will manage to succeed in doing so. Rwandan president Kagame, 
although sometimes accused of political repression, managed to successfully develop Rwanda 
on key indicators such as health and education, while simultaneously succeeding in his fight 
against corruption (New African Magazine 2013).  
Overall, the thesis’ hypothesis that a developing democratic state that exhibiting higher 
degrees of presidential powers, combined with the lack of proper checks on balances on the 
executive, will on average show lower control of corruption, does not find support in the data. 
Therefore, the hypothesis is rejected.  
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6 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this thesis was to answer the following research question: Are developing 
democracies with a higher degree of presidentialism associated with higher levels of 
corruption? The debate between presidentialism and parliamentarism and its respective 
benefits and problems is still ongoing, although not as popular as it was before. Several 
previous researches have tackled this question with varied results and methods. This is where 
the thesis departs from previous researches by adding a causal pathway that would attempt to 
explain this relationship.  
Based on the theoretical discussion, the following hypothesis was generated: 
H: The higher the degree of presidentialism in a developing democracy, the more likely is the 
state to exhibit higher levels of corruption, due to the lack of judicial and legislative 
constraints on the executive.  
A multivariate regression analysis was performed to test the hypothesis. The regression 
analysis consisted of nine models. The interaction variable, which consisted of the main 
independent variable (parpres, the proxy for presidentialism) and its interaction term 
(lackcontraint, the proxy for checks and balances), was added in the third model and it 
remained not significant throughout the specifications. Based on these results, it can be 
concluded that the hypothesis should be rejected. The answer to the research question is that 
based on the results of the analysis, developing democracies with more presidential powers 
are not associated with higher levels of corruption. 
Both schools of thought about presidentialism and parliamentarism have strong arguments for 
which of these institutional arrangement is better for the overall development of a state. Yet, 
there are very few researches that take other factors into consideration before attempting to 
conduct such analyses. Length of democracy, rule of law, independence of institutions etc. are 
all important when analyzing the effects of the type of executive.  
Presidentialism, by itself, is not necessarily the cause for lack of economic development or 
corruption. Besides the US, another successful presidential state is the Republic of South 
Korea. In South Korea, an effective system of checks in balances is in place, where the judges 
are partially appointed by the parliament and partially by the executive. The impeachment 
process is launched jointly by the parliament and the judiciary (Croissant 2014).  
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As explained previously, both systems have checks and balances in place (at least in theory). 
However, in parliamentary systems, the checks and balances are less clear, as the head of 
government is also part of the parliament and must always have the confidence of the majority 
if he or she wants to keep the position. In presidential systems, the checks and balances are 
more clearly defined, as the president (who is also the head of government) does not need to 
appease the majority in the legislature, thus making the executive and the legislature separate 
entities. While the theory does make a good case how presidentialism can be a source for bad 
governance in developing states, the result of the multivariate analysis does not support the 
theory. However, this only means that more research is required on the matter, as it goes 
against the results of most of the previous researches. Furthemore, lack of constraints on the 
executive was observed to be significant throughout most of the models in the robustness 
checks, indicating that the ineffectiveness of the judiciary and the legislature to successfully 
oversee the executive is associated with higher levels of corruption. This also supports the 
literature on underdeveloped democratic institutions in developing democracies. From a 
policy perspective, this paper to some extent reaffirms the importance an effective judiciary 
and legislature have in a developing state for curbing corruption. 
To write some concluding remarks on this thesis, it has been a challenge to conduct such a 
study, considering the limitations that it had in front of it. Not only did it have to justify its 
existence in a literature that stretches decades back into researching this particular issue, it had 
to critically re-evaluate the same literature in order to add something new to it. The issue 
needed revisiting, especially now with Sri Lanka slowly transitioning to a parliamentary 
republic and Turkey slowly digressing from a parliamentary republic to an almost totalitarian 
regime.  
Despite these limitations, the thesis does bring novelty to the field of political science. The 
thesis attempted to explain how presidentialism could affect corruption levels in developing 
democracies by introducing the causal pathway of judicial and legislative oversight. While the 
results did not support the thesis’ hypothesis, it at the very least showed that the results of the 
empirical analysis changes substantially when the following factors are considered: 
presidentialism being measured as a continuous variable instead of a categorical one, 
introduction of a causal pathway, and analyzing a smaller, but focused sample size. Future 
researches on this topic should consider investigating how the presidents as leaders affect this 
analysis, while also complementing the quantitative analysis with a case study example of Sri 
Lanka and Turkey.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: List of all original variables and their sources 
A1: Variables used in the primary OLS regression analysis 
Name Original variable 
name 
Renamed/recoded 
variable  
Dataset and Source 
Control of 
Corruption 
e_wbgi_cce concor Vdem Dataset 6.2; 
World Bank 
Governance Indicators 
GDP per capita wdi_gdppccur GDP QoG Standard Dataset 
2017 version; World 
Development Indicators 
Total natural 
resource rents 
(% of GDP) 
wdi_natrr nrents Qog Standard Dataset 
2017 version; World 
Development Indicators 
Imputed Polity fh_ipolity2 ipolity QoG Standard Dataset 
2017 version; Freedom 
House 
Average Years 
of Education 
among citizens 
older than 15 
e_peaveduc / Vdem Dataset 6.2; 
UNESCO 
Government 
Censorship 
effort - media 
v2mecenefm medcens VDem Dataset 6.2 
Women political 
empowerment 
index 
vdem_gender fempolemp VDem Dataset 6.2 
HOS removal 
by legislature in 
practice 
v2exremhsp_osp HOSRemove VDem Dataset 6.2 
HOS dissolution 
in practice 
v2exdfdshs_osp HOSdissolve VDem Dataset 6.2 
HOS appoints 
cabinet in 
v2exdfcbhs_osp HOSappoint VDem Dataset 6.2 
[44] 
 
practice 
HOS veto power 
in practice 
v2exdfvths_osp HOSveto VDem Dataset 6.2 
HOS dismisses 
ministers in 
practice 
v2exdfdmhs_osp HOSdismissministers VDem Dataset 6.2 
HOS proposes 
legislation in 
practice 
v2exdfpphs_osp HOSpropose VDem Dataset 6.2 
HOS = HOG v2exhoshog HOSisHOG VDem Dataset 6.2 
Relative power 
of the HOS 
v2ex_hosw HOSHOGpower VDem Dataset 6.2 
Judicial 
constraints on 
the executive. 
Higher value 
signifies 
stronger 
constraints. 
v2x_jucon jucon VDem Dataset 6.2 
Legislative 
contraints on 
the executive. 
Higher value 
signifies 
stronger 
constraints. 
v2xlg_legcon legcon VDem Dataset 6.2 
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A2: Variables used in robustness checks 
Name Original variable 
name 
Renamed/recoded 
variable  
Dataset and Source 
Corruption 
Perception Index 
e_ti_cpi / QoG Standard Dataset 
2017 version; 
Transparency 
International 
Per capita GDP at 
current prices - US 
dollars 
/ ungdp UN Data 
Fuel exports (% of 
merchandise exports) 
wdi_expfuel fuel QoG Standard Dataset 
2017 version; World 
Development 
Indicators 
Proportion of seats 
held by women in 
national parliaments 
(%) 
/ / World Bank Data 
Freedom of 
Expression 
bti_foe freexp QoG Standard Dataset 
2017 version; 
Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Regime Durability p_durable / QoG Standard Dataset 
2017 version; Monty 
G. Marshall and Keith 
Jaggers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[46] 
 
Appendix B: Descriptive statistics of primary variables 
VARIABLE TYPE N MIN MAX MEAN SD 
DV: Control of 
Corruption 
(concor) 
Interval 83 -1.44 0.92 -0.460 0.496 
IV: Mean of 
presidential 
powers (parpres) 
Interval 83 0.14 0.181 1.1175 0.501 
IN: Mean value 
of lack of 
constraints on 
the executive 
(lackconstraint) 
Ordinal 83 0 2 0.72 0.686 
IVIN: 
Interaction term 
(interaction) 
Interval 83 0.00 3.62 0.909 1.03 
C1: GDP per 
capita (ln_GDP) 
Interval 83 244 13799 4284.69 3703.018 
C2: Total 
Natural 
Resource Rents 
(% of GDP) 
(ln_nrents) 
Interval 83 -6.91 3.61 1.314 2.084 
C3: Imputed 
Polity (ipolity)  
Interval 83 3.17 10.00 7.118 1.678 
C4: Average 
Years of 
Education 
among citizens 
older than 15 
(e_peaveduc) 
Interval 83 1.24 11.01 6.621 2.356 
C5: Government 
censorship effort 
(medcens) 
Interval 83 0.10 2.93 1.409 0.647 
C6: Female 
political 
empowerment 
(fempolemp) 
Interval 81 0.44 0.96 0.739 0.116 
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Appendix C: Graphs showing normal curves and their natural logarithmic values 
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Appendix D: Construction and coding of parpres variable 
Original variable Description Recoded variable  recoding 
v2exremhsp_osp How likely can the 
legislature remove HOS 
in practice. Higher value 
indicates higher 
likeliness of success. 
HOSRemove HOSremove= 
1-v2exremhsp_osp. 
Recoded so higher value 
means that HOS is less 
likely to be removed. 
v2exdfdshs_osp How likely is the HOS to 
succeed in dissolving the 
legislature in practice 
HOSdissolve / 
v2exdfcbhs_osp Does the HOS have the 
power to appoint cabinet 
members? 
HOSappoint / 
v2exdfvths_osp HOS veto powers. HOSveto / 
v2exdfdmhs_osp Can the HOS dismiss 
cabinet members at will? 
HOSdismissministers / 
v2exdfpphs_osp The ability of HOS to 
propose legislation. 
Higher value indicates 
less independence in 
proposing legislation. 
HOSpropose HOSpropose= 
2- v2exdfpphs_osp 
Higher value indicates 
more independence in 
proposing legislation. 
v2exhoshog Is the head of state also 
the head of government?  
HOSisHOG / 
v2ex_hosw Power relation between 
head of state and head of 
government, when HOS 
is not HOG. Higher 
value indicates more 
power in favor of the 
head of state. 
HOSHOGpower / 
/ / parpres Mean (Hosremove, 
HOSdissolve, 
HOSappoint, HOSveto, 
Hosdismissminiters, 
HOSpropose, 
HOSisHOG, 
HOSHOGpower) 
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Appendix E: Construction of interaction variable 
 
Original variable Description Recoded Variable recoding 
v2x_jucon Judicial constraints on 
the executive. Higher 
value signifies 
stronger constraints. 
jucon jucon= 1- v2x_jucon 
Higher value signifies 
weaker constraints. 
 
v2xlg_legcon Legislative contraints 
on the executive. 
Higher value signifies 
stronger constraints. 
legcon legcon= 
1-v2xlg_legcon 
Higher value signifies 
weaker constraints. 
/ / lackconstraint 
(interval) 
Mean (jucon, legcon) 
  interaction 
COMPUTE 
interaction=lackconstraint 
* parpres 
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Appendix F: Robustness Check 
F1: Description of substitute variables 
VARIABLE TYPE N MIN MAX MEAN SD 
DV: 
Corruption 
Perception 
Index (e_ti_cpi) 
Interval 79 19.00 65.00 36.506 9.772 
C1: UN 
measure of 
GDP per 
Capita 
(ln_ungdp) 
Interval 80 5.44 10.69 7.988 1.202 
C2: Export of 
fuel in % of 
total 
merchandise 
exports (lnfuel) 
Interval 67 -9.40 7.73 2.398 3.754 
C3: Women 
share of 
parliamentary 
seats (womparl) 
Interval 74 0.000 43.800 18.743 11.182 
C4: Freedom 
of expression 
(freexp) 
Interval 83 0.29 0.97 0.769 0.120 
C5: The 
number of 
years since the 
most recent 
regime change 
(p_durable) 
Interval 60 0 93 19.43 16.495 
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F2: Bivariate regressions between original and substitute variables 
Original and substitute variables Pearson’s r 
e_ti_cpi and concor 0,966*** 
ln_nrents and ln_fuel 0,410** 
ln_GDP and ln_ungdp 0.715*** 
fempolemp and womparl 0.502*** 
medcens and freexp  0.817*** 
ipolity and p_durable 0,436** 
 
F3: Robustness checks regressions 
Dependent variable: e_ti_cpi (Corruption Perception Index); same predictors 
  
 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9   
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   
parpres -4.561* -0.089 -0.928 -0.540 0.921 1.034 0.908 1.037 1.139   
(2.20) (1.98) (2.36) (2.26) (2.29) (2.29) (2.32) (2.31) (2.35)   
lackconstraint -32.393*** -38.610*** -32.325** -34.324** -30.586** -29.928* -37.785** -36.132** 
(5.46) (10.84) (10.62) (10.36) (11.18) (11.31) (12.85) (13.28)   
interaction 1.389 1.196 1.279 1.174 1.085 1.523 1.178   
(2.09) (2.00) (1.95) (1.95) (1.97) (1.99) (2.08)   
ln_GDP 2.436** 1.588 1.354 1.803 1.686 1.654   
(0.87) (0.93) (0.96) (1.32) (1.32) (1.34)   
ln_nrents -1.167* -1.137* -1.131* -1.194* -1.251*  
(0.51) (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) (0.52)   
ipolity 0.657 0.719 1.110 0.983   
(0.73) (0.74) (0.80) (0.86)   
education b/se -0.429 -0.491   
(0.58) (0.58) (0.60)   
medcens 2.782 2.887   
(2.19) (2.27)   
fempolemp 5.953   
(9.59)   
_cons 41.726*** 48.492*** 50.450*** 28.661** 35.974*** 31.652** 29.538** 27.073* 23.724   
(2.74) (2.55) (3.90) (8.67) (9.01) (10.22) (11.12) (11.24) (12.37)   
R2 0.053 0.353 0.356 0.417 0.457 0.463 0.465 0.477 0.469   
N 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 78
BIC 587.8 562.1 566.0 562.5 561.4 564.8 568.9 571.5 569.5   
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 ***p<0.001
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Dependent variable: concor (Control of Corruption); different predictors 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
parpres -0.242* -0.078 -0.068 -0.041 0.047 0.022 0.037 0.097 0.067
(0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
lackconstraint -1.387*** -1.324* -1.247* -0.978 -1.098 -1.216 -2.678* -2.744*
(0.27) (0.51) (0.53) (0.58) (0.84) (0.83) (1.02) (1.24)
interaction -0.015 -0.021 -0.056 -0.097 -0.074 0.005 0.026
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.23)
ln_ungdp 0.054 0.055 0.014 -0.029 0.031 0.004
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
lnfuel -0.026 -0.024 -0.017 -0.026 -0.024
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
p_durable 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
education 0.046 0.033 0.039
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
freexp -2.114* -2.005
(0.93) (1.06)
womparl 0.002
(0.01)
_cons -0.190 0.141 0.120 -0.364 -0.488 -0.089 -0.057 1.667 1.726
(0.13) (0.13) (0.19) (0.43) (0.46) (0.73) (0.72) (1.02) (1.19)
R-sqr 0.060 0.291 0.291 0.329 0.380 0.272 0.306 0.397 0.404
N 83 83 83 80 64 43 43 43 41
BIC 121.8 102.9 107.2 105.4 83.6 74.6 76.3 74.0 76.6
* p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
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Appendix G: Country list and Control of Corruption values 
COUNTRY concor COUNTRY concor COUNTRY concor 
Albania -0,72 Liberia -0,59 Vanuatu 0,44 
Argentina -0,49 Macedonia 0,02 Venezuela -1,24 
Armenia -0,53 Madagascar -0,57 Zambia -0,36 
Bangladesh -0,87 Malawi -0,44 
Benin -0,93 Maldives -0,46 
Bhutan 0,82 Mauritius 0,39 
Bolivia -0,7 Mexico -0,41 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
-0,3 Moldova -0,6 
Botswana 0,92 Mongolia -0,52 
Brazil -0,07 Montenegro -0,1 
Bulgaria -0,24 Morocco -0,44 
Burkina Faso -0,52 Mozambique -0,58 
Burundi -1,44 Namibia 0,29 
Cape Verde 0,79 Nepal -0,83 
Central 
African 
Republic 
-0,89 Nicaragua -0,78 
Colombia -0,44 Niger -0,63 
Comoros -0,73 Nigeria -1,15 
Costa Rica 0,58 Pakistan -1,06 
Dominican 
Republic 
-0,83 Panama -0,39 
Ecuador -0,66 Papua New Guinea -1,04 
Egypt -0,59 Paraguay -0,84 
El Salvador -0,38 Peru -0,4 
Fiji -0,45 Philippines -0,59 
Georgia 0,25 Romania -0,26 
Ghana -0,1 Sao Tome and Principe -0,39 
Guatemala -0,62 Senegal -0,29 
Guinea -1,07 Serbia -0,31 
Guyana -0,75 Seychelles 0,33 
Haiti -1,24 Sierra Leone -0,95 
Honduras -0,94 Solomon Islands -0,45 
Hungary 0,28 South Africa -0,17 
India -0,56 Sri Lanka -0,24 
Indonesia -0,66 Suriname -0,37 
Ivory Coast -0,86 Tanzania -0,8 
Jamaica -0,36 Thailand -0,34 
Kenya -1,09 Togo -1,02 
Kyrgyzstan -1,09 Tunisia -0,15 
Latvia 0,15 Turkey 0,17 
Lebanon -0,87 Uganda -0,98 
Lesotho 0,11 Ukraine -1,03 
 
